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‘Soft law’ is a fact of public life. Cast in terms of competing demands for 
flexibility and responsiveness, and consistency and coherence, official business 
could not sensibly be carried on without, to adopt a generous working definition, 
rules of conduct or pointers and commitments which are not directly legally 
enforceable but which may be treated as binding in particular legal or 
institutional contexts.1 While the phenomenon is commonly associated with 
international governance, it has increasingly resonated in public law scholarship 
if under different labels. An uncodified constitution, famous since Victorian 
times for conventions of the constitution bearing on the behaviour of, and 
relations between, principal organs of the State,2 is a natural habitat.  
Examining a range of usages, this essay looks at soft law as an instrument for, 
and barometer of, constitutional and administrative development over the course 
of a lifetime. Reflecting and reinforcing the notion of legalisation in 
contemporary society,3 commonly observed in terms of more legislation and 
more jurisprudence, as well as more lawyers, it pursues the idea of ‘soft law 
abounding’. While naturally vulnerable to the growth of formal legal norms, 
soft law techniques are also apt to be stimulated by it, in part by way of 
supplement and/or experiment, in part by way of counter-reaction.  
The pervasive sense of ambiguity, as also the broad spectrum of rules, 
agreements, communications, etc. familiarly in play, is the other main starting 
point. Putting to one side the simplistic view of polar opposites, an influential 
institutionalist model references different dimensions to legalisation, whereby 
law is characterised as ‘harder’ or ‘softer’ according to the degree and precision 
of the obligations created, as well as the extent of involvement by a court or 
tribunal.4 Factors which point in a particular direction, a strong demand for 
authoritative interpretation and/or the constitutional symbolism of formal law 
perhaps, or conversely a preference for experimentation or ‘learning by doing’, 
                                                          
1In enlarging on rules of conduct while up-fronting legal or institutional relevance, this 
formulation is wider and stricter than the well-known definition from which it is adapted: F. 
Snyder, ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community’ in S. Martin (ed.), 
The Construction of Europe (Kluwer Academic, 1994), p. 198.  
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may then be identified in functionalist fashion.5 It is well to remember however 
that while the choice of soft law technique will often be mundane, it may on 
occasion be a matter of significant political and/or legal dispute.  
A chief theme of the essay is the way in which in different periods and different 
policy contexts certain types of soft law take on a new importance. Normative 
concerns relating to the creation and deployment of soft law technique are 
raised accordingly. As well as the classic bureaucratic modalities of rule 
formulation and application, particular attention is paid to the need for co-
operative and co-ordinating arrangements associated with latter-day dynamics 
of constitutional and administrative fragmentation and multi-level governance. 
While the UK is the chief focus, consideration must also be given to the EU, 
where the use of soft law scales new heights.  
1. Extended State  
Going back forty years or so, we find public law scholars in the UK making 
determined efforts to rebalance the discipline with bottom-up perspectives. 
Taking inspiration from the United States,6 this meant focusing on, in American 
terminology, ‘bureaucratic law’;7 and, more particularly, on the division 
between ‘rules’, ‘principles’ and ‘standards’,8 and the potential for better forms 
of rule-making. The twin-sided nature of internal guidance and policy 
instructions, low down in the formal legal hierarchy but typically the first port-
of-call for officials, commanded close attention.9 Intimately bound-up with 
demands for entitlements to public provision, emphasis was duly placed on 
structuring, confining and checking the exercise of official discretion. The less 
pleasant areas of the extended post-war administrative State were a major target: 
policing of course, and then on through the seeming vagaries of, for example, 
social security administration and immigration control.10  
In fact, some relevant themes had already been identified. Take the close 
interplay of hard law in general, and delegated legislation in the form of 
statutory instruments in particular, with suitably Weberian or internal 
hierarchical exercises of control through instruction, advice and guidance. 
While noting that classification depended on which definition of law is adopted, 
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an issue which has duly morphed into never-ending theoretical dispute wherever 
the label ‘soft law’ appears, 11 the first English administrative law text of the 
post-war period made the practical importance of bureaucratic rules abundantly 
clear. As this determinedly functionalist account explained, both the control of 
administrative authorities and the ways in which they exercised their powers 
were ‘very often … more a matter of administrative practice’. Readers should 
beware ‘the fallacy of forcing a contrast between law and practice at the point 
where the two meet’. 12  
Then there is the typically ad hoc and piecemeal nature of the development in 
the UK Constitution, which bears directly on this functional mix. As a means of 
promoting efficiency and consistency in the administrative process, while 
avoiding technical language, and also the elements of cost, delay and rigidity 
associated even with statutory instruments, particular soft law usages often have 
much to commend them. On the other hand, as the inter-war Donoughmore 
Committee on Ministers’ Powers lamented, ‘constitutional practice’ on the 
making (or otherwise) of delegated legislation  had ‘grown up gradually … 
without any logical system’.13 Part of, and inevitably reflected in, the mass of 
paper circulating in government offices, this was the ragbag of rules, regulations, 
orders, etc.  
Although historically blighted by wild claims of ‘administrative lawlessness’,14 
a healthy scepticism about executive practices with law-like effects has deep 
roots in the common law. Bureaucratic rules bearing on the relation of the State 
and the individual are apt to court controversy and, not least on a ‘thin’ version 
of the rule of law, rightly so. Seemingly beneficent administrative practices may 
be objectionable on grounds of preferential treatment and, depending in part on 
the extent to which the judicial review system is geared to protection of the 
individual, be more difficult to challenge. Such themes reached the august pages 
of the Law Quarterly Review some seventy years ago.15 ‘Administrative quasi-
legislation’ was the phrase coined to point up the significance of extra-statutory 
arrangements such as tax concessions. The analysis was more prescient than the 
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Law and Orders (Stevens, 1945).  
author might have imagined in this age of the card index. On from a world 
largely bounded by statutes, statutory devices and case law, ‘administrative 
quasi-legislation’ was part of ‘an expanding universe’ confronting the legal 
practitioner. 
Codes and circulars, policy notes and guidance, official notices and practice 
statements, etc. – succeeding decades would indeed witness ‘an exponential 
growth’ of quasi-legislation ‘in a plethora of forms’. The term itself became part 
of the English public law vocabulary.16 And the more that was seen, the more 
blurred things looked. Just as statutes might acquire an official gloss by policy 
statements, so it was realised that soft law could have varying degrees of legal 
force short of direct enforceability through judicial proceedings. Or as might 
now be said, ‘steering’ the behaviour of others through means such as 
interpretative guidance, designating relevant criteria, and evidence of good 
practice, is all part of the ‘practical effects’. In this age of FOI and ICT, 
however, it is hard to convey how much digging was required from public 
lawyers in a UK polity typified by official secrecy. A chief normative concern 
informing bottom-up approaches was the inaccessibility of much soft law 
material. In turn, reflecting concerns familiarly bound up in many constitutional 
systems with separation of powers, this underscored the lack of legislative - 
democratic - control. Perhaps hopefully, a dose of ‘government in the sunshine’ 
might not only broaden horizons but also serve as a valuable discipline.17 
Fitting with a broad post-war consensus over the welfare state and mixed 
economy,18 much was still heard of ‘voluntarism’. Take central-local 
government relations, where the commendable notion that voluntary acceptance 
of rules is preferable to legal enforcement or justiciability held much sway.19 As 
an instrument for co-operation and co-ordination in a burgeoning sector, 
‘government by circular’ was something of a leitmotif of British public 
administration in the mid-20th century. Across the broad spectrum of persuasion 
and compulsion, things could hardly remain static however. As epitomised by 
the rise of statutory codes of practice, in particular delivering different 
government policies in the workplace, a trend developed of harder-edged forms 
of quasi-legislation. Evidently, trust was in increasingly short supply. 
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Maxwell, 1987), p. 1. See also, R. Baldwin and B. Houghton, ‘Circular arguments: the status 
and legitimacy of administrative rules’ (1986) PL 239.  
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see W. West, ‘Administrative rule-making: An old and emerging literature’ (2005) 65 Pub. 
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A muted role for the courts in the constitution had also benefited the many 
architects of quasi-legislation.  There was the occasional judicial grump or 
expression of puzzlement about circulars for example,20 but for many years little 
more than that. The totemic case of British Oxygen21 furthered the cause of 
bureaucratic rules by confirming that statutory discretion included discretion to 
make them as an expression of policy. Provided then the official mind was not 
entirely closed to exceptional circumstance, coherent and consistent guidance 
for dealing with multiple applications passed judicial muster. This was welcome 
recognition of the practical realities of modern administration.  
2. Shake-up time  
It is during the long years of Conservative government from 1979 that the now 
standard vocabulary of ‘soft law’ replaces that of ‘quasi-legislation’. No doubt 
this reflects a growing internationalisation of public law;22 and, more 
particularly, the burgeoning forces in this period of European integration. 
Rendered against the backdrop of a more globalised economy, and pointing up 
important means for aiding processes of convergence, the determinedly ductile 
term thus became standard currency in these related spheres in the 1980s.23 
Further however, it could encompass wider usages associated with the fashion 
for New Public Management (NPM) and the ‘hollowing out of the state’24 or 
passage of central government functions sideways to agencies and business as 
well as upwards to the EU. Surprising as it may sound, soft law then was an 
important component of the ‘Thatcher Revolution’. 
Take the flag-ship enterprise of sharpening policy performance by carving out 
executive bodies from monolithic central departments. Originally formulated in 
terms of ‘next steps agencies’, in the long view it constituted a standard twin-
track methodology of formalising administrative arrangements and, by denying 
a separate statutory base, avoiding justiciability. Behind this lies the rise of 
‘pseudo-contract’, which denotes the use in public administration of contract-
type arrangements which are not true contracts in the legal sense of agreements 
enforceable in the courts.25 Another example of soft law as a means of 
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65 TLR 69.        
21 British Oxygen Co Ltd v Ministry of Technology [1970] 3 WLR 488. 
22 D. Feldman, ‘The Internationalization of Public Law and its Impact on the UK’ in J. Jowell 
and D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution (OUP, 7th edn, 2011). 
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267. 
24 R. Rhodes, ‘The hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public service in 
Britain’ (1994) 65 Pol. Q.138. 
25 Harlow and Rawlings, ‘Law and Administration’, 2nd edn 1998, ch. 8.  See further, A. 
Davies, Accountability: A public law analysis of government by contract (OUP, 2001). 
modelling institutional relations, it is the realm of published framework 
documents establishing mandate, budget, targets, etc. Nor could the 
constitutional significance be gainsaid, as some sharp controversy about 
ministerial accountability in relation to these arm’s length bodies 
demonstrates.26 Predictably, the issue rumbles in light of the UK constitutional 
fundamental of parliamentary government; and the more so, in view of newly 
assertive parliamentary committees. 27 
Alternatively, take privatisation and the establishment of the ‘Ofdogs’, a new 
breed of statutory agencies effectively tasked with light-touch regulation and/or 
promotion of competition for the utilities. There is again a dual dynamic: not 
only the challenge to pre-existing informal means of ‘club government’ in vital 
sectors of the economy,28 but also an attempt to avoid the disruptive potential of 
litigation, even perhaps American-style ‘adversarial legalism’, in the regulatory 
process. 29  Designed against the backdrop of a strengthening role for judicial 
review in the Constitution, the statutory template was highly permissive in 
character: broad mandate and bare statutory requirements on which it was 
difficult to hang claims of unlawfulness. Conditions then were ripe for a 
vigorous growth of soft law through the exercise of agency discretion to make 
procedural rules; in particular, when Ofdogs sought to bolster regulatory 
legitimacy by trumpeting good governance values of transparency, participation 
and accountability.30 Nonetheless, concerns about a lack of firm and consistent 
process and insufficient accountability especially to Parliament continued to 
dog this highly-personalised model of small agencies headed by a Director-
General.31 Chief vehicle of a strong market ideology, it could not survive the 
more rounded quest for ‘better regulation’ eventually inaugurated under New 
Labour, which notably included clarification of key duties and heightened 
process requirements.32  
Soft law as a barometer of institutional relations is further illustrated in the 
Conservatives’ dealings with local government. On from voluntarism: just as 
market disciplines should be unleashed, so competing sources of political power 
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31 Report of the Commission on the Regulation of Privatised Utilities (Hansard Society, 
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(ed.), English Public Law (OUP, 2nd edn., 2009). 
were to be reined in. Though the transformation of persuasive guidelines into 
statutory provision was hardly new, the 1980s clearly mark a step-change in this 
assertion of central control, concentrated round, but not confined to, compulsory 
competitive tendering and local government finance.33 A not insignificant part 
of the story, however, concerns the capacity of soft law to regenerate in 
different forms. In the light of ever more elaborate ‘hard law’ intervention, 
interpretive guidance, advice, and best practice statements abounded, further 
serving in the hands of the Audit Commission as a major conduit for the bracing 
functional values of efficiency, economy and effectiveness through the sector.34 
The intimate connection with the evaluative paraphernalia of benchmarking, 
performance indicators and league tables, which so shaped public service 
provision in this period,35 is made apparent.  
At one with broader dynamics of ‘juridification’, the discernible tendency to 
formalise and encapsulate social relations in terms of law,36 it is also in this 
period that ‘tertiary rules’ becomes familiar in the public law lexicon.37 Once 
more highlighting the grey zone beyond the exercise of secondary legislative 
power conferred under statute or prerogative, the usage testifies to a still-
expanding range of soft law techniques with ‘the purpose or effect of 
influencing bureaucratic decision-making in non-trivial fashion’.38 This 
particular development fits with the premium placed on NPM methodology, 
very dependent on rules for measuring, evaluating and controlling the work of 
subordinates.39  
Given an additional boost by the harnessing of self-regulatory systems, most 
obviously in the professions,40 the trend of agencification is again relevant. 
Tertiary rule-making would be closely associated with the burgeoning range of 
bodies exercising statutory – public – power. Standing for specialisation 
grounded in multiple sources of rule-making authority, the process is indicative 
not only of great variety, but also heralds a leitmotif of our contemporary, 
commonly fragmented and less bounded, system of governance: inter-
                                                          
33 M. Loughlin, Local Government in the Modern State (Sweet & Maxwell, 1986).  
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36 G. Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, aspects, limits, solutions’ in G. Teubner (ed.), 
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38 L. Sossin and C. Smith, 'Hard Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and 
the Role of Courts in Regulating Government' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Rev 867, p. 871. 
39  C. Hood and C. Scott, ‘Bureaucratic regulation and new public management in the United 
Kingdom: Mirror-image developments?’ (1996) 23 JLS 321. 
40 R. Baggott, ‘Regulatory reform in Britain: The changing face of self-regulation’ (1989) 67 
Pub. Admin.436.  
institutional soft law in the form of all those Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs).  
Leading authorities in the process of widening and deepening the ambit of 
judicial review, a pair of cases sees the House of Lords chipping away at 
executive freedom of manoeuvre in relation to soft law. Effectively sanctioning 
the general practice in the National Federation case,41 the court accepted that a 
discretionary tax concession challenged by third parties was reasonable and 
realistic. Liberalising standing to sue in accordance with the public interest in 
administrative legality also sent the message of no blank cheque. The GCHQ 
case42 is twice relevant. A prime site for soft law technique, prerogative power 
would no longer constitute an entire judicial no-go area.43 Boosted, the doctrine 
of legitimate expectation would give some usages of soft law a harder edge. 
Indeed, when subsequently extended to substantive expectations of service 
delivery,44 it would prove particularly troublesome for public administration 
because of an inchoate jurisprudence.45 The judicial contribution, however, 
must be kept in perspective. Amid the tough use of statutory provision, central-
local relations duly became a ‘litigation hot-spot’. On the other hand, 
illustrating that much in the broad constitutional development passed the courts 
by, ‘judge-proofing’ the new modalities of regulation proved highly successful.  
3. Speeding on  
By the beginning of the century, visualisations of ‘soft law’ were becoming 
more and more stretched; the ‘expanding universe’ sometimes appeared to have 
no outer limit! One well-known account referred, for example, to ‘rules, 
manuals, directives, codes, guidelines, memoranda, correspondence, circulars, 
protocols, bulletins, employee handbooks and training materials’.46 Practical 
effects yes, but not all of this documentation is quasi-legislation as previously 
conceived. Future historians will surely fasten on the fundamental changes in 
public decision-making and service delivery brought about by the introduction 
of ICT and the evolution of e-governance. On again from ‘tertiary rules’, such is 
the dizzying era of ‘fourth generation legislation’ in the form of computer 
programs or all those algorithms, decision-trees and checklists increasingly used 
in mass administrative systems.47 Multiplying the problems of democratic – let 
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45 Though see now R(Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] EWCA Civ 327. 
46 Sossin and Smith, ‘'Hard Choices and Soft Law’, p. 871. 
47 R. de Mulder, ‘The digital revolution: From trias to tetras politica’ in I. Snellen and W. van 
de Donk (eds.), Public Administration in an Information Age (IOS Press, 1998).  
alone judicial – control, the very precision denotes hard-edged forms of soft law. 
Computers, after all, speak the language of rules.  
The seemingly unstoppable rise in public law of ‘risk regulation’48 is another 
main driver. Such is the logic of a wide-ranging methodology predicated on 
setting regulatory standards via an assessment of risks of particular sectors and 
ordering regulatory activities by reference to the risks which particular operators 
pose to an agency’s goals. For confirmation, one need only look at the 
burgeoning websites of powerful public institutions like the Environment 
Agency and the Health and Safety Executive. In the guise of information for 
stakeholders, these are replete with examples of soft law ranging, along one axis, 
from the highly prescriptive to the indicative and voluntary; and, along another 
axis, from internal operational advice to guidance for the regulated and the 
public. Behind this lies the world-wide quest for so-called ‘better’ and/or ‘smart’ 
regulation,49 founded on principles of proportionality, consistency and targeting, 
and transparency and accountability. Sometimes legislatively mandated, more 
often as in the case of the legislative process administratively so, impact 
assessment has rapidly emerged as a chief analytical device in the UK.50 This is 
the stuff of templates geared to more or less expansively defined costs and 
benefits, as well as input and output processes of consultation, monitoring and 
compliance. Glossing over the functional limitations of measurement, IA thus 
stands for a (pseudo-)scientific pursuit of rational policy development - one 
which epitomises the strong enabling role of soft law technique in 
administrative procedure.  
Building on the foundations laid in the Thatcher years, techniques of contractual 
governance are today so mainstreamed in UK public administration that they 
frequently go unremarked. All the more reason to point up the way in which, as 
a repository for rules, principles and standards, contract-style technique 
functions as a major source of regulation.51 The recent Supreme Court case of 
New London College52 is a useful touchstone, concerning as it does private 
provision of international educational services regulated by a system of 
licensing that mandates much regulatory activity by the market actor. Again 
sanctioning the widespread use of soft law forms, the Court rejected the 
argument that published guidelines setting out the requirements for the retention 
                                                          
48 E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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and grant of licences required express legislative authority. In adopting a broad 
view of the minister’s ancillary and incidental powers, the majority fastened on 
her general statutory responsibility to administer the system of immigration 
control. Perhaps more worryingly in terms of effective judicial protection, the 
majority did not rule out the existence of substantial, residual, executive power 
analogous to the power of natural persons to do that which is not prohibited.53  
In reworking the relation of State and individual in open-ended and horizontal 
fashion, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010 neatly illustrate 
the propensity of particular types of statutory provision to foster large growths 
of soft law. Such is the never-ending struggle to ‘mainstream’ principles and 
values in the administrative process, as initially by a ‘human rights task force’ 
with special responsibility for producing core guidance for public bodies,54 and 
subsequently through the ‘guidance for all’ made available on the website of the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission. It is also in the nature of the 
enterprise that wide-ranging public sector duties on eliminating discrimination 
and promoting equality of opportunity give a particular push to bureaucratic 
rule-making. Conversely, we see how soft law technique takes on additional 
(political) salience as a means of combatting (concerns about) mistaken 
compliance: so-called ‘myth-busting advice’ on how rights should be 
balanced.55  
Reflecting the great contemporary demand for transparency, and hence for 
writing things down, a further dynamic sees soft law technique gaining in 
prominence in terms of conventions and the place of the Executive in the 
Constitution. First published in the 1990s, the UK Government Ministerial Code 
is a textbook example of soft law as a medium for constitutional continuity and 
change. Buttressing and elaborating conventions through an informal process of 
codification is of the essence of the enterprise.56 At one and the same time, the 
ground rules of ministerial responsibility in the Westminster system are 
rendered more specific and detailed; and, with optional assistance from an 
independent adviser, the Prime Minister’s position as ‘ultimate judge’ of 
ministerial behaviour is reasserted.57 ‘A guide to laws, conventions and rules on 
the operation of government’ finalised in 2011, the UK Government Cabinet 
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Manual suitably illustrates the often intricate interplay between different types 
of legal, political and administrative instruments in the Constitution. 58 
Highlighted by a controversial attempt to declare a convention on government 
formation, the Manual also serves to demonstrate the innate insider – Executive 
– advantages of soft law technique (and hence the particular importance of 
public consultation).59 In seeking to provide an authoritative but necessarily 
brief sketch of the complex business of government, it further points up both the 
force and the descriptive limitations of soft law writing. 
We are living through a crisis of trust, or so it is said.60 Once more 
demonstrating the innate capacity of soft law technique for multi-tasking, one of 
the more attractive features of the contemporary constitutional landscape is the 
spread across the public sector of clearly articulated codes of behaviour - ethics 
- designed both to buttress institutional legitimacy and give public 
accountability a sharper cutting-edge. As one might expect, much in the 
development is events-driven, as notoriously in the case of parliamentarians. 
Key elements include the fact of multiple sources, older-established bodies like 
the Parliamentary Ombudsman61 as well as specially created ones such as the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life;62 the mutually supportive use of 
overarching principles of objectivity, impartiality, integrity and honesty; and the 
evident scope for statutory underpinning as latterly in the case of the Civil 
Service.63 If it goes too far to speak, as one leading commentator does, of a 
politics-free dimension to the Constitution,64 this characteristically earnest 
development well-illustrates the pioneering and colonising attributes of soft law 
technique.  
Overshadowing everything in the UK Constitution today is the troubled state of 
the Union. An ‘Edinburgh Agreement’65 positing a possible break-up was 
hardly what the architects of the 1998 ‘devolution settlement’ had in mind. 
Against this backdrop, the heavy premium placed on soft law in 
intergovernmental relations is all the more noteworthy. Further illustrating how 
particular usages take on a new importance in changing constitutional and 
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political climes, devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland thus 
spawned another major species of ‘pseudo-contract’, so-called ‘concordatry’.66 
In a typically pragmatic approach to constitutional development, the demand to 
maintain good working relationships finds expression in myriad documentation 
on principles, structures and processes. There is even a hierarchy of sorts: the 
principal MoU67 on basic desiderata of co-operation, consultation, co-ordination 
and respect for confidentiality and on essential political machinery (the Joint 
Ministerial Committee); overarching concordats with large multilateral 
elements, most notably on EU policy coordination; and bilateral concordats 
between individual UK departments and their counterparts centred on functional 
policy issues. Ad hoc and piecemeal development, lack of transparency, 
organisational skews in favour of the UK Government: major concerns 
originally raised continue to be voiced.68 However, practical workings also 
confirm that considerations of administrative necessity and convenience play a 
major role in this sprawling field of parallel and interlocking powers, even in 
the face of political discord. Periodic review of the soft law construction 
underwrites processes of institutional learning and fine-tuning; disruptive forms 
of intergovernmental litigation have largely been avoided.69 Looking forward, 
the hard-fought campaign and eventual ‘no’ vote in the Scottish independence 
referendum heralds a looser form of Union in which more is devolved to the 
Celtic lands (and perhaps in England).  Primarily in bilateral fashion, but also 
increasingly perhaps under the auspices of the British-Irish Council,70 soft law 
as an instrument of intergovernmental co-operation should continue to flourish 
in this cluttered Isle.  
4. EU governance  
The EU abounds in soft law instruments, ranging from declarations attached to 
treaties and high-level inter-institutional agreements to influential Commission 
recommendations and opinions, and on through to the much ‘softer’ mass of 
internal guidelines and instructions.71 In fact many of the purposes remind one 
of national as well as international practice: hierarchical control of a 
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bureaucracy, policy recommendations or guidelines, codes of practice for 
multiple actors, etc.72 Changing patterns again command attention as particular 
usages are accentuated in different domains and, referencing the expanded 
competence, in the EU context at large. Special mention must be made of 
attempts at the turn of the century to revivify the European project, associated 
with the Commission’s famous White Paper on European Governance.73 
Representing a boost for soft law technique, much would be heard of an equally 
flexible rubric, ‘new governance method’, and hence the potentials for ranging 
beyond an official ‘Community method’ premised on formal legislative 
procedures and institutional balance.74 
The way in which soft law is shaped by situation is powerfully illustrated in the 
case of EU administration, which is to an unusual degree fragmented, not least 
in the light of Enlargement. A heavy premium is placed on so-called ‘network 
governance’; committees to represent Member States, more or less informal 
arrangements of regulatory bodies and experts, and increasingly EU agencies, 
clutter the landscape. While apparent in all kinds of constitutional systems, the 
demand for effective means of communication, cooperation and coordination is 
magnified. Another luxuriant growth of soft law technique is identified, with as 
a natural habitat myriad forms of administrative procedure.75 Again, there is no 
better example than the EU of the role of institutional politics. Take the question 
of hard law consultation requirements; transparently keen to impose them on 
Member States, the Commission unsurprisingly insists on the grave 
disadvantages of ‘an overly-legalistic approach’ in respect of its own 
procedures.76 Duly pressed by the European Parliament,77  the further question 
arises of introducing some kind of European Law of Administrative Procedure 
at Union level. Whether by way of compromise the Commission is tempted to 
accept a systematised set of ‘Model Rules’78 remains to be seen.  
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Normative debate over the uses and abuses of soft law technique has been 
particularly sharp in the EU context, and understandably so.79 From the 
standpoint of the Commission, historically determinedly integrationist, soft 
governance forms hold out the prospect of avoiding legislative procedures it 
does not control, of pressing forward in areas of joint or limited competence, 
and, via procedural convergence and all that dissemination of best practice, 
working towards stronger forms of harmonisation. Conversely, for critics of the 
enterprise, there are clear and present dangers of disguised EU expansionism, 
coupled with major problems of democratic scrutiny, not least by national 
parliaments, and civil society. Then again, for those of us concerned to promote 
the values of pluralism and diversity in the European construction, soft law 
technique continues to offer solid advantages in terms of innate respect for 
difference in and among the Member States.  
The Open Method of Coordination commands attention as a flagship of 
decentralised process. Officially hailed as ‘a means of spreading best practice 
and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals’, more 
particularly economic growth and social progress, OMC involves techniques 
familiar from NPM: benchmarks and performance indicators for the Member 
States, backed up with periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review 
designed as mutual learning processes.80 General objectives and guidelines for 
policy development and implementation underwrite this. As a way of ‘learning 
by doing’, and paying due respect to the principle of subsidiarity, OMC has 
much to commend it. Conversely, concerns about efficacy or practical results, 
as well as limited involvement by the Parliament and restricted participation by 
sub-state and non-state actors, are par for the course.81  
Other important elements are highlighted here. The weak adjective cannot 
disguise the potentials for soft law with ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’, for example 
through ‘naming and shaming’ or, more tangibly, financial resources. Beyond 
imperium or the formal command of law, we touch here on the great power of 
dominium: the deployment – or otherwise – of wealth in aid of policy 
objectives. Then there is the manifold scope for hybrids or mixes of forms: as, 
simply, when making guidelines is mandated. OMC has taken soft forms of 
governance to new heights; treaty articles and sector specific legislation helped 
                                                          
79 For a sense of the wider discussion, see successively, T. Christiansen and S. Piattoni, (eds.), 
Informal Governance in the European Union (Edward Elgar, 2003); and T. Christiansen and 
C. Neuhold (eds.), International Handbook on Informal Governance (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
80 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 23 - 24 March 2000; and see E. 
Barcevičius, J. Weishaupt and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Assessing the Open Method of Coordination 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
81 A Harcourt, ‘Participatory gains and policy effectiveness’ (2013) 51 JCMS 667. 
to provide a framework.82 Not before time, EU literature increasingly 
emphasises the complementarity of ‘new’ modes of soft governance and formal 
legal methods.83  
Major EU regulatory frameworks serve to illustrate significant soft law 
contributions. A thoroughgoing reform of competition procedures sees national 
bodies like the UK’s new Competition and Markets Authority actively engaged 
in enforcement of EU rules, while the Commission concentrates on big cases. 
While naturally providing powers, procedures and sanctions, the governing 
legislation84 cedes space to the European Competition Network. Stretching 
across Union and Member State levels,85 and designed for efficient case 
allocation and exchange of information and evidence, this grouping of 
enforcement bodies is increasingly seen taking on policy issues and generally 
promoting a common competition culture. Operating through countless 
meetings and a secure intranet and database, it is grounded in a Commission 
notice; the ECN has no formal legal personality. Evaluation is typically mixed: 
high scores for efficiency and effectiveness; good governance concerns over 
lack of transparency and external accountability. In France Telecom,86 the 
General Court resisted the temptation to interfere in internal workings. In 
establishing the criteria for case allocation, the notice properly excluded 
individual rights to have a particular national authority investigate.87  
Multiplying soft law guidance is the natural concomitant of reform prioritising 
self-assessment; a feature underscored by the demand to explain the economic 
analysis now critical in competition enforcement. As against the adversarial 
legalism familiarly associated with antitrust, the Commission rightly prizes the 
potential of informal rules to ‘enhance the efficiency of investigations and 
ensure a high degree of transparency and predictability’,88 Procedural soft law 
has both innovative and defensive roles to play in a regulatory domain long 
associated with ‘rights of the defence’ in a jurisprudence now extending to the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Echoing and commonly expanding on the 
formal legal protection, Commission best practice has burgeoned, together with 
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more in-house checks for testing proposed enforcement action.89 In the leading 
case of Schindler,90 the Court of Justice sensibly rejected a challenge to the 
Commission’s fining guidelines, which structure the exercise of discretion 
through mathematical formulae geared to the gravity and duration of 
infringements. The Regulation provided the legal basis for sanctions; no Treaty 
provision prohibits an institution from adopting such ‘rules of practice’. Nor, in 
view of the dose of clarity, was the fact of broad discretion inconsistent with the 
rule of law. 
Alternatively, take the recent drive for ‘Banking Union’, the realm of the much 
vaunted single supervisory mechanism (SSM), a complex set of institutional 
arrangements centred on the Eurozone. The European Central Bank (ECB) has 
dual responsibility for supervising big banks and for the general health of the 
system, while national authorities supervise other institutions.91 Testimony to 
the level of political concern, the governing legislation92 is full of provision in 
favour of co-ordination and co-operation across the tiers; thick procedural forms 
of soft law will follow on naturally. Two usages stand out however. The key 
constitutional issue of the ECB’s accountability to the European Parliament (EP) 
for its new role is classic territory for an inter-institutional agreement.93 Cast in 
terms of competing demands for confidentiality and transparency, it is certain to 
be tested. The UK meanwhile, enjoying the biggest share of EU financial 
services business through the City of London, famously shows no intention of 
joining the Eurozone/SSM. Close cooperation between the ECB and the Bank 
of England will be vital for effective prudential supervision in the Single Market. 
Denoting the inconvenient truth of a dual supervisory system, this will rest on 
MoUs.94  
Conclusion  
Enough has been said to show why public lawyers, or at least those interested in 
the real world of public power, should take soft law seriously. At one level, the 
day-to-day functioning of the constitutional and administrative law system can 
only properly be understood with reference to the broader mass of soft law 
usages. Notably, the scale and continuing importance of the soft law 
contribution in the UK gives the lie to the monochrome view of change from, in 
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the language of that most familiar contemporary debate,95 a ‘political’ to a ‘legal’ 
constitution. At another level, soft law technique can so easily put in issue good 
governance principles: the classic trio of transparency, participation and 
accountability. This is especially troubling when, as is frequently the case with 
European integration, it is used in determinedly instrumentalist fashion. Self-
serving usages by particular groups of actors or institutions, however, should 
not obscure major attributes of flexibility and responsiveness, institutional 
efficiency, and accommodation of difference. Context is by no means 
everything, but in the case of soft law it goes a long way! At another level again, 
soft law technique is a useful prism through which to view the uses and – yes – 
functional limitations of standard hard law techniques. Amid the rich 
complexities of contemporary society, it is not only the efficacy of soft law 
methodology which is in issue.  
While it does not do to ignore differences from directly enforceable legal rules, 
both in terms of legitimacy and practical effect, the many different forms of 
hard(er) and soft(er) law must not be overly compartmentalised. A recurring 
theme of the essay is the scope for creative mixes of technique, sometimes as a 
functional necessity and on other occasions as part of a sophisticated 
governance framework or direction of travel. Soft law forms may now be said to 
demonstrate a strong kaleidoscopic quality: complex, dynamic, variegated. 
Ranging beyond the indelible association with internal administrative rules as 
part of the lifeblood of bureaucracy, a long but sometimes thin strand of public 
law scholarship has rightly engaged with external usages and effects, not least 
in terms of the challenges for traditional constitutional means of legislative and 
judicial control. Expanding on this, another key message of the essay is the 
place of soft law as a chief vehicle for, and measure of, the changing relations 
of citizens with public authority, the burgeoning elements of regulatory and 
technocratic power, and the successive constructions of inter-institutional 
relations.  
A major set of contemporary drivers for soft law technique is identified. As 
regards formal legal and regulatory usages for example, specific factors include 
both the style and substance of legislation and recent fashions in ‘better’ or 
‘smart’ regulation and audit. In somewhat paradoxical fashion, the evident 
demand to bolster transparency and public trust also sees soft law technique 
increasingly applied. Partly it is a matter of supply, where the digital revolution 
opens up whole new lines of soft law development. Constitutionally-speaking, 
however, it is the twin drivers of devolution and European integration which 
command attention, as also diverse forms of agencification. In the form 
especially of pseudo-contract, soft law usages are shown taking on another lease 
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of life in the cause of co-operation, co-ordination etc. Indeed, when viewed in 
historical perspective, the broad dynamics of soft law development show little 
sign of slackening: quite the reverse. It is the multiple capacities for 
regeneration, reinvention and reproduction displayed in different periods and 
policy contexts which shine through. Soft law always has tomorrow. 
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